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ANALYSIS ON THE CONTROL FUNCTION OF THE DEWAN
PERWAKILAN DAERAH (REGIONAL REPRESENTATIVES
COUNCIL) THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Dr. Fatmawati, S.H., M.H.
Abstract
The Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representatives Council - DPD)
and the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representatives - DPR) are
institutions which represent the people in the parliament of the Republic
of Indonesia. However, these two institutions do not have equal powers,
including the powers related to the control function. The DPD’s function
related to control is provided for under Article 22D paragraph (3), Article
23E paragraph (2), and Article 23F paragraph (1) of the Third Amendment
to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The DPD can
exercise control of the implementation of certain laws related to regional
interests, the implementation of the State Budget, taxes, education and
religion, reporting on the results of supervision exercised by it to the
DPR; it receives the results of state finance audit conducted by the Badan
Pemeriksa Keuangan (Audit Board - BPK), and provides its consideration
to the DPR in electing members of BPK. Based on a comparison among
various countries it is evident that although some countries have weaker
control authorities compared to those of the DPD, it is the DPD elected
directly through the general elections which has the weakest authority
among them. Proportionate powers need to be granted to the DPD in
order to ensure that that the objective of its establishment in representing
the interests of the regions may be achieved.
I.

Key words: DPD, DPR, control function, interests of the regions.
Introduction

The Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia
(hereinafter briefly referred to as the 1945 Constitution) has caused significant
changes not only in the parliament’s structure, namely not only in the position
and powers of the Majelis Permusyawaran Rakyat (People’s Consultative
Assembly - MPR) and in the powers of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House
of Representatives DPR), but also by establishing a new institution, namely the
Regional Representatives Council (hereinafter briefly referred to as the DPD).
The DPD was formed as a materialization of the idea of a bicameral
system introduced during the deliberations on the amendment of the 1945
Constitution. The DPD has its own structure, position and powers, which are
(FHUI).



The author is a Lecturer of Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia


Refer to Jimly Asshiddiqie, (2006), Konstitusi dan Konstitusionalisme Indonesia, (The Constitution
and Constitutionalism In Indonesia), rev. ed., 3rd edition, Jakarta: Setjen dan Kepaniteraan Mahkamah
Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, p. 186-187 and Bagir Manan, (2004), DPR, DPD dan MPR dalam UUD 1945
Baru, (DPR, DPD and MPR In the New 1945 Constitution), 2nd ed.,Yogyakarta: FH UII Press, p. 59-60.
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provided for in the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution. The DPD is a
new state institution which has been formed with the aim of enhancing the role
of the regions. However, considering its position as part of the parliament, the
DPD’s powers are rather limited. This seems to reflect the argument put forward
by MPR members, namely that a strong bi-cameral Indonesian parliament in the
future would cause the development of state organizational structure to move
towards federalism.
Even though the unicameral system is still the choice of many, the
majority of countries which play a significant role are applying the bicameral
system. The bicameral system is the concept which was expected to be adopted
in the organizational structure of the parliament of the Republic of Indonesia
following the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, to replace the one and a-half
chamber system of the parliament of the Republic of Indonesia. In the context of
forming the bicameral system, the DPD was established as the second chamber
in parliament. The DPD represents the people in the regional context and it
is oriented towards the interests of the regions, while the DPR represents the
people in general and it is national interest oriented.
The amendments of the 1945 Constitution provide for the Parliament of
the Republic of Indonesia consisting of 3 chambers, namely the DPR, DPD, and
MPR. The DPR, DPD and MPR are independent institutions considering that,
first, the DPR, DPD and MPR possess powers which correspond to the functions
of the parliament. By possessing formal powers as the parliament, the DPR, DPD,
as well as the MPR have their respective scope of office, which means that each
of them have their own respective authorities, which are naturally based on
their respective functions. Second, the DPR, DPD and MPR each have their own
respective members, and third, the DPR, DPD as well as the MPR have their own
institutional structure and procedural rules in their respective institutions.
The DPD’s authorities related to the control function are provided for
under Article 22D paragraph (3), Article 23E paragraph (2), and Article 23F

Refer to Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, (2001), Risalah Rapat Pleno ke-14 Panitia Ad Hoc 1
Badan Pekerja MPR 10 Mei 2001 Nomor: MJ 230/9/2001, (Minutes of the 14th Plenary Meeting of Ad Hoc
Committee I of MPR Board of Staff dated May 10, 2001 Number: MJ 230/9/2001), p. 24 and 32. This was
stated by Jacob Tobing and Hobbes Sinaga (both of them are from the PDIP Faction) in the 14th Plenary
Meeting on May 10, 2001.

Refer to George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, (1997), Bicameralism, (London: Cambridge
University Press), p. 1. In the research conducted by George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money in 1997, 1/3 of
all countries in the world are using the bicameral system, and 2/3 are using the unicameral system. Refer to
Arend Lijphart, (1999), Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries,
(New Haven and London: Yale University), p. 202. Based on the research involving 36 countries conducted
by Arend Lijphart, the bicameral system is applied by more countries than the unicameral system

C.F. Strong, (1952), Modern Political Constitution an Introduction to the Comparative Study of Their
History and Existing Form, rev. ed., London: Sidgwick & Jackson Limited, p. 186. Refer also to Lijphart, ibid.,
p. 202-203. This was also found in the research conducted by Arend Lijphart of 36 countries. The bicameral
system is used by a greater number of countries and only small countries (the largest of them being Greece
with a population of about 10 million) use the unicameral system. Out of the said 36 countries, all federal
countries (9 countries) use the bicameral system; at the same time, 13 out of 27 unitary states countries
use the unicameral system, and 1 country (Norway) uses the one and a-half chamber system.  

Manan, DPR..., op cit., p. 59-60. Bagir Manan states that the idea behind the formation of the DPD
was to change the legislature to the bicameral system and to increase the participation of regions in the
political life and management of the state.

Jimly Asshiddiqie, (2005), Hukum Tata Negara and Pilar-pilar Demokrasi Serpihan Pemikiran
Hukum, Media, dan HAM, (Constitutional Law and Pillars of Democracy, Some Thoughts On Law, the Media
and Human Rights), 1st ed., Jakarta: Konstitusi Press, p. 27.
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paragraph (1) of the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution. The DPD may
conduct control of the implementation of certain laws related to the interests of
the regions, the implementation of the State Budget, taxes, education and religion
and it reports the result of control conducted by it to the DPR, receives results of
the audit of state finances conducted by the BPK, and provides considerations to
the DPR in electing members of the BPK. Based on a comparison among various
countries it is evident that, although some countries have weaker supervisory
authorities compared to those of the DPD, it is the DPD elected directly through
the general elections which has the weakest authority among them.
An analysis of the DPD’s powers related to the control function will
be provided in this article, based on a theoretical study and comparison of
DPD’s control functions to other countries, in order to enable DPD to attain
proportionate powers with the aim of ensuring that the objective of the formation
of the DPD as a people’s representative institution representing the interests of
the regions may achieved.
II.

Analysis of the DPD’s Control Function

This article will deal only with the control functions of the DPR and DPD
as provided for in the 1945 Constitution, as both of these institutions have the
function of supervising the implementation of government administration.
The following are the provisions of the 1945 Constitution, among other things,
concerning the DPR and DPD:
1. Members of the DPR are elected through general elections.
2. The DPR has the power to make law.
3. The DPR has legislative, budgetary and control functions.10
4. Members of the DPR have the right to propose bills.11
5. The DPD is elected from each province through general elections.12
6. The total number of members of the DPD from each province shall be the
same, and the total number of members of the DPD shall not be more than
one-third of the total number of members of the DPR.13
7. The DPD may propose to the DPR certain bills which are related to interest of
the regions.14

Republic of Indonesia, Perubahan Kedua Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun
1945, (Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia), State Gazette
No. 12, Year 2006, Article 19 paragraph (1).  

Republic Indonesia, Perubahan Pertama Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun
1945, (First Amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia), State Gazette
No. 11, Year 2006, Article 20 paragraph (1).
10
Republic of Indonesia, Perubahan Kedua..., (Second Amendment), op cit., Article 20A paragraph
(1).
11
Republic of Indonesia, Perubahan Pertama..., (First Amendment), op cit., Article 21.
12
Republic of Indonesia, Perubahan Ketiga Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia
Tahun 1945, (Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia), State
Gazette No. 13, Year 2006, Article 22C paragraph (1).
13
Ibid., Article 22C paragraph (2).
14
Ibid., Article 22D paragraph (1) sets forth as follows: “Dewan Perwakilan Daerah  may propose
to the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat bills related to regional autonomy, relationship between the center and
regions, the formation and expansion as well as the merger of regions, management of natural resources
and other economic resources, as well as bills related to the financial balance between the center and
regions.” - Unofficial translation
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8. The DPD shall take part in elaborations on bills related to the interest of the
regions and shall provide considerations to the DPR regarding the bill on the
Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (State Revenues and Expenditures
Budget - APBN) and bills related to taxes, education and religion.15
9. The DPD may conduct control of the implementation of certain laws
which are related to the interests of the regions, the implementation of the
State Budget, taxes, education and religion and submits the results of the
supervision conducted by it to the DPR.16
If the authorities of the DPD under the 1945 Constitution are considered
in comparison to the authorities of the Senate under the Constitution of the
Republik Indonesia Serikat (the Federal Republic of Indonesia – RIS), there are
certain similarities. According to Bagir Manan, the similarity between the above
mentioned Constitutions is that the formulation of the DPD’s authorities follows
the pattern of authorities of the RIS Senate, however, a fact overlooked is that
the RIS Senate consisted of representatives of sub-regions formed as part of the
design of the Dutch colonial government, in addition to the fact that the Republic
of Indonesia itself did not want the Senate to be equal to the DPR.17 If we take
another look, it becomes evident that the Senate had even greater authorities
during era of the RIS Constitution compared to the authorities of the DPD.
The formal authorities of the two chambers in Parliament provided for
under the RIS Constitution were as follows:
1. The approval of the Senate and DPR had to be obtained for the federal
government to implement governmental duties in the sub-regions.18
2. The following authorities had to be exercised in a joint session:
a. Granting approval for the declaration of war by the federal
government.19
b. Exercising the authorities of the Konstituante, however, by adding
the number of members to become twofold of the previous total of
members.20
3. The proposal, deliberation and decision on Bills concerning the amendment
of the RIS Constitution could only be implemented if approved by 2/3 of the

15
Ibid., Article 22D paragraph (2) sets forth as follows: “Dewan Perwakilan Daerah shall take part
in deliberations on bills related to regional autonomy; relationship between the center and regions; the
formation, expansion and merger of regions; the management of natural resources and other economic
resources, and the financial balance between the center and regions; and shall give considerations to
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat on bills related to the state revenues and expenditures budget and bills related
to taxes, education and religion.” - Unofficial translation
16
Ibid., Article 22D paragraph (3) sets forth as follows: “ Dewan Perwakilan Daerah can oversee the
implementation of laws concerning: regional autonomy, the formation, expansion and merger of regions,
the relationship between the center and regions, the management of natural resources and other economic
resources, the implementation of the state revenues and expenditures budget, taxes, education, and religion,
and shall present the results of such oversight to Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat as input for consideration to be
followed up.” - Unofficial translation
17
Bagir Manan, DPR,…, op cit., p. 4.
18
Refer to Republik Indonesia Serikat (Federal Republic of Indonesia), Keputusan Presiden tentang
Mengumumkan Piagam Penandatanganan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia Serikat dan Konstitusi Republik
Indonesia Serikat, (Presidential Decree concerning the Charter for the Signing of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Indonesia and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Indonesia), Presidential
Decree No. 48, State Gazette No. 3, Year 1950, Article 54 paragraph (2).  
19
Ibid., Article 183.
20
Ibid., Article 188.
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attending members of the DPR and Senate.21
The following provisions of the RIS Constitution set out the Senate’s
formal authorities under the Constitution:
1. Propose candidates for the Chairperson of the Senate to the President for
appointment, and elect the Vice Chairperson from among its members.22
2. Formulate internal rules of procedure.23
3. Invite ministers to participate in the deliberations and make statements in
the sessions.24
4. Approve the appointment of the Chief Justice, Vice Chief Justice, and members
of the Supreme Court prior to regulation under Federal Law.25
5. Approve the appointment of the Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and members
of the Financial Supervisory Board prior to regulation under Federal Law.26
6. Hear important matters of specific nature concerning sub-regions or their
administrative units, related to the relationship between the RIS and the
regions, and related to Emergency Bills dealing with the implementation of
federal government in matters that, if the Senate is heard, are set out in a
decree by the Government.27
7. Request the Government to provide explanation.28
8. Jointly with the DPR formulate laws concerning important matters of specific
nature related to sub-regions or their units and related to the relationship
between the RIS and the regions.29
9. Propose Bills concerning sub-regions, their respective units, and related to
the relationship between the RIS and the regions.30
Jimly Asshiddiqie defines the function of control as follows:31
1) Control of policy making;
2) Control of policy executing;
3) Control of budgeting;
4) Control of budget implementation;
5) Control of government performance;
6) Control of appointment of public officials by acceptance or rejection, or in
the form of consideration by the DPR.- translation 	
Carl J. Friedrich defines the parliament’s functions as the representative
assemblies and deliberative assemblies. In implementing its function as
representative assemblies, the parliament’s main function is legislation.32 In
implementing its function as deliberative assemblies, parliament exercises
Refer to Ibid., Article 190
Refer to Ibid., Article 85.
23
Refer to Ibid., Article 95.
24
Refer to Ibid., Article 96.
25
Refer to Ibid., Article 114 paragraph (1).
26
Refer to Ibid., Article 116 paragraph (1).
27
Refer to Ibid., Article 123.
28
Refer to Ibid., Article 124.
29
Ibid., Article 127.
30
Ibid., Article 128.
31
Jimly Asshiddiqie, (2006), Pengantar Ilmu Hukum Tata Negara Volume II, (An Introduction to
the Science of Constitutional Law Volume II), 1st edition, Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal and Kepaniteraan
Mahkamah Konstitusi RI, p. 36. The President and Vice President are elected public officials. Refer to Jimly
Ashiddiqie, (2007), Pokok-Pokok Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia Pasca Reformasi, (The Fundamentals of
Indonesia’s Post-Reform Constitutional Law), Jakarta: PT Bhuana Ilmu Populer, p. 380-381.
32
Carl J. Friedrich, (1949), Constitutional Government and Democracy Theory and Practice in Europe
and America, rev. ed., Boston: Ginn and Company, p. 297.
21
22
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control of fiscal and government administration,33 and control of foreign
affairs.34

The DPD’s authorities related to the supervisory function are provided
for under Article 22D paragraph (3), Article 23E paragraph (2), and Article
23F paragraph (1) of the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution. The DPD
can conduct control of certain laws related to the interests of the regions, the
implementation of the State Budget, taxes, education and religion and submits
the results of supervision conducted by it to the DPR, receive results of the audit
of state finances conducted by the BPK, and provide considerations to the DPR
for selecting members of the BPK.
The DPD’s authorities related to limited control function as provided for in
the Amendment to the 1945 Constitution are certainly extremely small compared
to the parliament’s function of control as stated by Jimly Asshiddiqie and Carl J.
Friedrich. This has been due to the objection of the factions in the MPR which
have the power to amend the 1945 Constitution against the strengthening of the
regional delegates (Utusan Daerah) institutionally or even more so in terms of
authorities.35
Based on a comparison with several other countries it is evident that
even though all of its members are elected directly, the DPD’s authorities are
extremely limited. Compared to the Second Chamber in the Kingdom of Spain
which is also elected directly but has asymmetric authorities as opposed
to the first chamber, not only are the DPD’s authorities asymmetric, they are
extremely limited and the DPD is not independent in implementing its functions
as representative assembly and deliberative assembly. However, compared to
the Arab Republic of Egypt where 2/3 of members are elected directly, the DPD
has broader authorities, as in the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt it is
expressly stated that the power of the Second Chamber of its parliament consists
only of providing an opinion to the First Chamber and the President concerning
certain matters for which it should be consulted under the provisions of the
Constitution.36
The direct election of its members is supposed to strengthen the DPD’s
position, as stated by Lijphart, namely that the direct election of the secoThe
following statement was made by Bambang Soeroso in Constitutional Law
Ibid., p. 324.
Ibid., p. 347.
35
Refer to among other things Secretariat General of MPR-RI, Risalah Rapat Pleno Ke-32 Panitia Ad
Hoc I BP MPR 19 September 2001, Nomor 230/28/2001, (Secretariat General of the MPR of the Republic of
Indonesia, Minutes of the 32nd Plenary Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee I of the MPR Board of Staff, September
19, 2001, Number 230/28/2001), p. 36. Asnawi Latief stated as follows: “Therefore, as we stated in the
previous discussions concerning the MPR chapter, in our Faction we all share the view that the MPR consists
of members of DPR and Delegates or representatives of the regions. It is not referred to as Dewan (Council),
and neither is it an institution or a permanent baand or body, rather than that, it is an agglomeration of the
aspirations of regions so that in its manifestation it will only be dealing with the Regional Representatives
Faction.
Whether it is referred to as representatives (perwakilan) or delegates (utusan) is not an issue to
us, however, it is not a Council (Dewan). Accordingly, the MPR consists of members of the DPR representing
the many or the people in general, while the Utusan Daerah (Delegates of the Regions) or PD (Perwakilan
Daerah – Representatives of the Regions) are representatives representing their respective areas or
regions.” - Unofficial translation
36
Refer to Article 37 Amended Constitution Articles 2011 in “Constitutional Declaration: A New
Stage in the History of the Great Egyptian People”, www.sis.gov.eg/en/lastpage.aspx?category_id=155,
accessed on February 1, 2013.
33
34
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Study Center of the Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia (Pusat Studi Hukum
Tata Negara Fakultas Hukum Universitas Indonesia PSHTN-FHUI), “Meninjau
Kembali Agenda dan Prospek Perubahan Kelima Undang-Undang Dasar Negara
Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945”, (“A Review of the Agenda and Prospects of
the Fifth Amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of
Indonesia”), One-day Seminar, Djokosoetono Assembly Hall, Faculty of Law,
Universitas Indonesia, Depok, November 21, 2007, p. 8-9.nd chamber can
expand its limited power. As a matter of fact, in the context of the amendment
to the 1945 Constitution, in the Proposed Text of the Fifth Amendment it was
suggested, among other things, by the DPD group in the MPR, by Maswadi
Rauf, as well as by various research and survey conducted, that the DPR and
DPD should have equal powers. According to the Proposed Text of the Fifth
Amendment proposed by the DPD Group in the MPR, the DPR and DPD both
hold legislative powers,37 the DPR and the DPD have the function of legislation,
the function of controlling, the function of making appointments to public
offices, and the function of representation,38 and that in implementing their
respective functions, the DPR and DPD have the right to propose Bills, the right
to interpellation, the right to inquiry, and the right to state opinion.39 Maswadi
Rauf links the DPD’s authorities to its democratic legitimacy, namely the fact
that its members are elected directly by the people in general elections through
an election process which is just as rigorous as the election of DPR members,
therefore the DPD’s role should be equal to the DPR.40
In cases where the Second Chamber has the authority to conduct control,
the Constitution of several countries provides that such authority may be
implemented directly, without the obligation to go through the First Chamber
as provided for under the 1945 Constitution. Almost all countries applying the
presidential governance system provide in the Constitution that the second
chamber in parliament has the authority to summon ministers requesting them
to provide an explanation (except for the United State of America)
Article 22D paragraph (3) of the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution
sets out that the DPD can conduct control of the implementation of the law
related to the DPD’s authorities and report the results of such control conducted
by it to the DPR as input for further consideration and follow up.41 Ideally, there
should be a way of ensuring that the results of control conducted by the DPD can
be communicated directly to the government in order to avoid situations such
as the current one, whereby according to members of the DPD there is no way
of ascertaining the extent to which the results of their work are being further
realized at the DPR, while a huge amount of about 250 billion is allocated every
year for the work of the DPD.42 This was denied by one of the DPR members,
37
Refer to Kelompok DPD di MPR RI, (2008), “Naskah Amademen Undang-Undang Dasar Negara
Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945,” (DPD Group in the MPR of the Republic of Indonesia, Text of the Amendment
to the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia), Article 18.
38
Refer to Ibid., Article 23 parag\raph (1).
39
Refer to Ibid., Article 23 paragraph (2).
40
Maswadi Rauf, ”Keterwakilan dan Demokrasi”, Diskusi Publik Wacana Amandemen UUD 1945.
(“Representation and Democracy”. Public Discussion on the Discourse on the Amendment of the 1945
Constitution), Hotel Millenium, Jakarta, May 13, 2008, p. 2.  
41
Refer to Republic of Indonesia, Perubahan Ketiga..., (Third Amendment), op cit., Article 22D
paragraph (3).
42
The following statement was made by Bambang Soeroso in Constitutional Law Study Center of
the Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia (Pusat Studi Hukum Tata Negara Fakultas Hukum Universitas
Indonesia PSHTN-FHUI), “Meninjau Kembali Agenda dan Prospek Perubahan Kelima Undang-Undang Dasar
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stating that inputs from members of the DPD are taken into account, as evident
from the introduction of Dana Alokasi Khusus (Special Allocation Funds - DAK)
for the regions in the State Revenues and Expenditures Budget (APBN) which
did not exist in the past, so that in his view there is actually a need for further
provisions in the Law Concerning the Organizational Structure and Position of
the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD regarding the mechanism for DPR to report back
to the DPD.43 Even if such provisions concerning the mechanism for reporting
back by DPR to the DPD on the results of control conducted by the DPD were
included in the Law Concerning the Organizational Structure and Position of the
MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD, it would be a certainly more effective, transparent
and accountable mechanism to discuss the results of supervision conducted by
DPD with the government directly, as opposed to being proposed through the
DPR and then being reported back to the DPD.
The DPD was formed as the second chamber with expectations as
described in the amendment to the 1945 Constitution, namely that in addition
to accommodating the interests of regions to ensure that the general public
interests are fulfilled, with both the direct interests of the people as well as the
interests of regions being better represented in the decision making process
at the level of public policy making and thus consolidating the Unitary State of
the Republic of Indonesia, the DPD as the second chamber is also expected to
implement checks and balances in the parliament of the Republic of Indonesia
related to the interests of regions.44
Even though Indonesia is a unitary state, with the pluralistic characteristics
of human and natural resources in each of its regions, as well as with the
provisions of Article 18 paragraph (5) of the Second Amendment to the 1945
Constitution stating that:” Regional Governments shall exercise autonomy to the
broadest possible extent, with the exception of governmental affairs which are
determined by law as the affairs of the central government”,45 it would appear
theoretically that this is the federalist governance principle, as in fact it seems
that the concept of residual power is applied to the Regional Government.46 By
Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945”, (“A Review of the Agenda and Prospects of the Fifth Amendment to
the 1945 Constitution of the State of the Republic of Indonesia”), One-day Seminar, Djokosoetono Assembly
Hall, Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia, Depok, November 21, 2007, p. 8-9.
43
Stated by Agun Gunandjar, ibid., p. 16.
44
It was stated about checks and balances by Golkar Party Faction (Refer to Sekretariat Jenderal
MPR-RI, Risalah Rapat Pleno Ke-32 Panitia Ad Hoc I BP MPR…2001, (Secretariat General of the MPR of the
Republic of Indonesia, Minutes of the 32nd Plenary Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee I of the MPR Board of
Staff, 2001), op cit., p. 17-20, refer also to among other things Sekretariat Jenderal MPR-RI, Risalah Rapat
Ke-32 Panitia Ad Hoc I BP MPR 17 Mei 2000, (Secretariat General of the MPR of the Republic of Indonesia,
Minutes of the 32nd Plenary Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee I of the MPR Board of Staff, May 17, 2000),
p. 17), PBB Faction (Refer to Sekretariat Jenderal MPR-RI, Risalah Rapat Ke-32 Panitia Ad Hoc I… 2000,
(Secretariat General of the MPR of the Republic of Indonesia, Minutes of the 32nd Plenary Meeting of Ad
Hoc Committee I of the MPR Board of Staff, 2000), p. 7), PDKB Faction (Refer to Sekretariat Jenderal MPRRI, Risalah Rapat Pleno Ke-38 Panitia Ad Hoc I BP MPR 31 Mei 2000, (Secretariat General of the MPR of the
Republic of Indonesia, Minutes of the 38 Plenary Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee I of the MPR Board of Staff,
May 31, 2000), p. 15), and TNI/POLRI Faction (Refer to Sekretariat Jenderal MPR-RI, Risalah Rapat Pleno
Ke-32 Panitia Ad Hoc I BP MPR...2001, (Secretariat General of the MPR of the Republic of Indonesia, Minutes
of the 32nd Plenary Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee I of the MPR Board of Staff, 2001), op cit., p. 26).
45
Republic of Indonesia, Perubahan Kedua…, (Second Amendment), op cit., Article 18 paragraph
(5).
46
Ashiddiqie, Konstitusi dan..., op cit., p. 214.  Concerning residual powers in a federal state, refer
also to Eko Prasojo, (2005), Federalisme dan Negara Federal: Sebuah Pengantar, (Federalism and the Federal
State: An Introduction), Jakarta: Departemen Ilmu Administrasi FISIP UI, p. 75-76.
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focusing on region oriented laws, the aspirations of regions can be accommodated
to a greater extent, which is in line with the purpose of establishing the DPD. The
formulators of the RIS Constitution instituted the RIS Senate with this basic idea
in mind.
  
...pertama-tama bertoegas mendjaga kepentingan daerah bagian, kedoea
mempunjai arti oentoek menghindarkan poetoesan jang tergesa-gesa dan
oentoek memelihara soeatoe kelandjutan dalam kebidjaksanaan negara
sebagai imbangan dari ”waan van de dag”. Selain daripada arti kelandjoetan
oentoek pelaksanaan toegasnja pertama dengan baik, mereka karena alasan
itoe poela dalam senaat ingin mengadakan soeatoe anasir kesetimbangan
dengan djalan pilihan anggota oentoek waktoe jang lebih lama dan
menghentikannja berangsoer-angsoer.47
:...first [it] has the duty to safeguard the interests of sub-regions, second
it has the significance of avoiding precipitous decisions and ensuring
continuity in state policy as a counterpart of ”waan van de dag”. In addition
to the intended continuity in the appropriate implementation of the first
stated duties, for the same purpose members of the senate wish to create
an element of balance by electing members for a longer period of time and
dismissing them gradually.” - translation

However, unlike the RIS Senate, the DPD was formed without the
support of a strong will by the formulators of the Constitution to empower it,
even considering it as an obstacle in the implementation of the functions of
the parliament, both the representatives assembly as well as the deliberative
assembly functions, hence its powers had to be limited. While the second
chamber was formed, its benefits as a second chamber could not be felt as was
the case with the RIS Senate under the RIS Constitution.
As mentioned above, the existence of the DPD as second chamber does
have its justification, however, due to its limited functions including the legislative
function, the advantages of a bicameral system as described by George Tsebelis
and Jeannette cannot be eventually found in the Parliament of the Republic of
Indonesia. Moreover, compared to various countries all over the world which
have second chamber with legislative powers, including the Senate as second
chamber under the RIS Constitution, the above described limited authorities of
the DPD cannot be found in the second chamber of any other country.
As a result of the DPD’s limited powers, there have been proposals by
various parties for its dissolution, based on a variety of arguments. The argument
proposed by Effendy Choirie for the dissolution of the DPD is that it is a waste of
budgetary funds and by dissolving it, an anomaly in the Indonesian parliament
47
MOEKTAMAR FEDERAL BANDOENG 1948 PANITIA PERSIAPAN KENEGARAAN LAPOERAN
BOENDEL I (STUK No. 104/Ind.). (FEDERAL CONFERENCE BANDUNG 1948 STATE PREPARATORY
COMMITTEE REPORT BUNDLE I (STUK No. 104/Ind.), p. 43-44. Refer to Bentuk dan Susunan Pusat NIS
Bagian III Badan Perwakilan Butir 45: “...first [it] has the duty to safeguard the interests of sub-regions,
second it has the significance of avoiding precipitous decisions and ensuring continuity in state policy as a
counterpart of ”waan van de dag”. In addition to the intended continuity in the appropriate implementation
of the first stated duties, for the same purpose members of the senate wish to create an element of balance
by electing members for a longer period of time and dismissing them gradually.” - Unofficial translation
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would be eliminated.48 Based on the constitutional practices of various
countries, Louis Massicotte also mentions the high cost of the second chamber
as a cause for its dissolution, in addition to the argument that the authorities
of the first chamber and the second chamber are redundant, even though
the second chamber serves against a breakdown of the whole constitutional
regime.49 Direct elections do not guarantee that the second chamber cannot be
dissolved.50 Massicotte also states that 17 countries which had dissolved their
second chambers subsequently restored them, with most cases of restoration
occurring in countries in which the second chambers had been dissolved by an
authoritarian regime and were restored after the fall of such regime.51
In general, despite their relatively weak authorities, there is a need for
second chamber with a view to membership composition, whereby the second
chamber is the representation of a different category as opposed to the first
chamber.52 Some countries even make it mandatory to have representation of
customary communities,53 representation of laborers,54 representation based on
descent,55 representation based on the profession of faith,56 and representation

48
A. Effendy Choirie, “Mengapa DPD Perlu Diperkuat”, (“Why Does the DPD Need to Be
Strengthened”), http://www.indopos.co.id/index.php?act=detail_c&id=272631, accessed on November
1, 2008.   Effendy Choirie states the following arguments in view of the proposal for the dissolution of
the DPD: “First, letting the DPD with its currently existing authorities is a waste of state money which
cannot be allowed to continue. The amount of state budgetary funds expended since the formation of
this institution has reached Rp.300 billion. These budgetary funds have been used for salary payments to
members, secretariat staff, supporting expert staff, and building procurement cost. Second, maintaining
the DPD’s current format means preserving an anomaly in the system of Indonesia’s parliament. The DPD
is an institution with an unknown gender. It is not a legislator, even though it is in the legislative power
branch. It is not the DPR’s Advisory Council, because politically it has an equal position with the DPR. In its
present shape, the DPD assumes the form of an absurd institution.”
49
Louis Massicotte, (2001), “Legislative Unicameralism: A Global Survey and a Few Case Studies,”
Journal of Legislative Studies, vol.1, issue 1, p. 156.  Massicotte explains that there 34 countries which have
dissolved their second chambers, for 2 types of reasons, namely second chambers of developing countries
formed by a right-oriented authoritarian regime which were dismissed after the fall of such regime, and
second chambers which over time became almost identical to the first chambers, were high-cost or antidemocratic. Ibid., p. 155-156.  
50
Ibid., p. 156. Louis Massicotte provides the example of countries with directly elected, but
subsequently dissolved second chambers, namely Nebraska (1973), Cuba (1960), Equador (1979),
Nicaragua (1979), Turkey (1980), Peru (1992), and Venezuela (1999).
51
Ibid., p. 157.
52
Refer to Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan, (2001), “Fundamentals of Institutional
Design: The Functions and Powers of Parliamentary Second Chambers”, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol.1,
issue 2, p. 52.
53
Members of the Second Chamber of the State of Bostwana are appointed from among customary
community chiefs (that is why Lipjhart categorizes Bostwana, along with the United Kingdom, as between
medium-weak bicameralism). In the State of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Second
Chamber consists of representatives of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples. Article 171 of the Constitution
of Colombia provides for 2 additional senators from the Indian tribes in the Second Chamber of the
parliament of Colombia.
54
In the state of the Arab Republic of Egypt, ½ of members of the First Chamber and 2/3 of
members of the Second Chamber come from laborers and farmers.
55
Members of the Second Chamber in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
are appointed to represent the class of lords and bishops.
56
In addition to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the state of Lebanon
also provides that the second chamber consists of “spiritual families”. Refer to ”Bicameralism in the Africa
and Arab World”, (February 2001)”, http://www.senat.fr.senatsdumonde/bicamerafrica2001english.html,
p. 12, accessed on April 9, 2009.
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of women in the Secondary Chambers of their parliament.57 The purpose of
providing for the representation of certain categories of citizens in the community,
particularly representatives of customary communities in several Arab and
African countries, is to ensure that the interests of communities in the regions
are accommodated in policy making at the national level, as well as to guarantee
greater stability of the state concerned.58 In some of these countries the Second
Chambers do not have the power to make law because their preferred function
is that of a conciliation institution being the primary factor in the social and
institutional stability of such countries, as stated by Lord Bryce: “Legislatures
contain too little of the stores of knowledge, wisdom and experience which each
country possesses.”59 Unlike the bicameral system in western countries, the
bicameral system in Arab and African countries has been established to function
as a stabilization and conciliation factor.60 The bicameral system in Arab and
African countries has basically developed in 2 phases, namely stabilization in
which the Second Chambers serve as a balance to the various existing forces,
and then they take on the role of law making and supervision.61
As Afan Gafar states, in addition to checks and balances, the basic
philosophy for applying the bicameral system is the degree of representiveness
in countries with a high level fragmentation enabling them to accommodate
the dynamics developing in society.62 As explained above, even though as the
second chamber the DPD does not have voting right (the right to reject) there
is still a need for its presence as second chamber. The DPD is an upgrade of the
Utusan Daerah (Regional Delegates) in the MPR prior to the Amendment of the
1945 Constitution. Unlike the Utusan Golongan (Functional Representation), all

57
Refer to Taiwan Constitution, Article 26 of the Constitution of the Republic of China. In the state
of the  Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the  President appoints  1/3 of members of the Second Chamber,
with a percentage of 50% of women who have expertise and experience.
58
Pamela Martino, “Africa: Algeria, Burundi, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Repubblica democratica del Congo, Rwanda,
Swaziland“, http://www.csfederalismo.it/DocumentFolder/Mastro_Africa_enpdf, accessed on April
9, 2009, p. 3. Refer also to ”Bicameralism in Africa and the Arab World,(2001),” loc cit., p. 11-12. It is
stated that the as a result of the representation of customary communities, the aspirations of customary
communities are accommodated at the national level in the process of law making, and this is better than
making institutional agreements, because it is more authentic and therefore it creates stability.
59
Lord Bryce as quoted by Pamela Martino, ibid.
60
”Bicameralism in the Africa and Arab World”, loc cit., p. 14-15.
61
Ibid.
62
Sekretariat Jenderal MPR-RI, Risalah Rapat Pleno Ke-15 Panitia Ad Hoc I BP MPR 15 Mei 2001,
Nomor: MJ 230/10/2001, (Secretariat General of the MPR of the Republic of Indonesia, Minutes of
the 15th Plenary Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee I of the MPR Board of Staff, May 15, 2001, Number: MJ
230/10/2001), p. 12. ”Second, the philosophy related to the degree of representativeness. In a society or
state with an extremely high degree of fragmentation the bicameral mechanism is usually applied, and
this is what we see happening in various countries in the context of accommodating the abundance of
aspirations developing in the community.
Therefore, my appeal to you is to consider the reason for adopting the bicameral system based on
these two philosophical premises, rather than in view of your interest, but first, the checks and balance
mechanism, let there be no institution control another institution, and then the representativeness of the
representative institutions should also be genuinely guaranteed, thus providing a guarantee to all of the
existing groups in society.
We have an extremely high level of fragmentation, moreover, it is obvious that such consolidation
of economy, class, ethnicity, religion, language, archipelago cannot possibly be accommodated by a single
people’s representative institution alone; therefore, a people’s representative institution capable of truly
accommodating this degree of aspirations needs to be considered, as well as the working mechanism
between these two institutions, which again depends on the rules of procedure applicable at these two
institutions in various countries.” - Unofficial translation

Year 2 Vol. 2, May - August 2012

INDONESIA Law Review

~

.~

factions agreed to keep and strengthen the existing Utusan Daerah (Regional
Delegates) in the MPR. The philosophical basis for the formation of the DPD
stated by the factions in the MPR at the time of the amendment of the 1945
Constitution was basically that the DPD was expected to represent the people and
institutions representing the interests of the regions, with the expectation that
the interests of the people in general, both the direct interests of people as well
as the interests of the regions, would be represented in a more representative
manner in the decision making process at the public policy level.63 In the case
of a country like Indonesia, having a vast territory with a diverse archipelago,
natural and human resources, where certain areas are bordering directly with
neighboring countries, the interests of the regions must be managed properly.
The second chamber, even though weak, is still needed in a country like
Indonesia, as well as in other countries which have a dense population and
extensive territories, particularly countries with heterogeneity both in terms of
human as well as natural resources. This is to prove that the existence of the
second chamber is not merely a competition between the first chamber and the
second chamber,64 because the basis for forming the second chamber, in addition
to the representation of various interests of the community, is also primarily for
it to serve as a precaution against the emergence of tyranny by the majority,
tyranny by the minority, as well as the tyranny of individual leaders.65
While the state of the Republic of Indonesia is a unitary state, the wish to
strengthen the regions has lead to the transformation of the Regional Delegates
(Utusan Daerah) into the DPD. Accordingly, despite Lijphart’s statement that
there is a strong empirical relationship between bicameral-unicameral and a
dichotomy between federal-unitary; all federal states are using the bicameral
system in their parliaments, while some non-federal states are using the
bicameral system and others the unicameral system,66 based on the wish to
accommodate the regions, a second chamber in addition to the DPR, namely the
DPD, was also accommodated. There is also certain contradiction in Lijphart’s
statement related to the population size, whereby according to Lijphart, large
countries tend to use strong bicameralism,67 while the Republic of Indonesia is
using medium-strength bicameralism. This is also related to the opinion that it
would be more difficult to implement the law making and supervisory functions
if the DPD had equal formal powers with the DPR.
The second chamber also plays an important role in safeguarding the
Constitution, whereby despite its asymmetrical formal powers compared to
the first chamber, the second chamber has a responsibility in the amendment
Ibid., p. 30-31.
Refer to Bivitri Susanti, “Mewakili Daerah-kah Dewan Perwakilan Daerah”, (“Does the Regional
Representatives’ Council – DPD Actually Represent the Regions”), paper in the discussion “Eksistensi
Dewan Perwakilan Daerah dalam Rangka Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah di Indonesia,” (“The Existence of
the Regional Representatives’ Council (DPD) in the Context of the Implementation of Regional Autonomy
in Indonesia,” Depok, Faculty of Law, Universitas Indonesia (FHUI), May 9, 2005, p. 4. “The key word in
bicameral parliament is competition between the upper house and the lower house. Regardless of the
membership model applied …, the bicameral concept is certain to have a mechanism whereby the two
houses compete against each other in implementing their respective authorities as provided for under the
constitution.”
65
Refer to George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, (1997), Bicameralism, (London: Cambridge
University Press), p. 35-36.
66
Arend Lijphart, Patterns…op cit., p. 213.  
67
Ibid.
63
64

Year 2 Vol. 2, May - August 2012

INDONESIA Law Review

~

.~

of the Constitution.68 Members of the DPD, who are also members of the MPR,
have powers in amending the 1945 Constitution. Consequently, the DPD has
the powers to channel the aspirations of the regions for safeguarding or even
amending the Constitution.
The second chamber also has the power to influence policy, despite its
limited powers, by issuing statements as members of parliament in connection
with bills under deliberation, and by implementing its functions as deliberative
assembly.69 High quality Bills proposed by the DPD and considerations stated in
writing by the DPD can encourage the parliament’s overall performance, both
the DPR and particularly the DPD, especially when the DPD’s high-quality views
and opinions can be communicated to the public more optimally.
Various countries which have second chamber with formal powers that
are asymmetrical to those of the first chamber have been implementing a series
of institutional strengthening, by developing their abilities as the people’s
representatives and by taking a more active role in overseeing the government.
Today, the senates of the world undergoing change. Some, like the Canadian
Senate, are under strong pressure to reform. Others, like the U.S Senate,
have become more institutionally open and more electorally sensitive. The
British House of Lords has developed greater professionalism as a legislative
body and become more effective. The German Bundesrat has been called
upon to absorb representation from the states of formerly Communist East
Germany. In other setting-Poland, Romania, South Africa, Spain-senates
have recently become substantially more democratic.70
The DPD can do the same, by conducting internal strengthening. The fact
that the system of weak bicameralism is applied in the parliament of the Republic
of Indonesia does not mean that the DPD is unable to function maximally. Out
of a total of 22 countries analyzed, 2 countries are using perfect bicameralism,
7 countries are using strong bicameralism, 11 are using weak bicameralism,
and 2 countries are using very weak bicameralism. Based on the foregoing it is
evident that weak bicameralism is the most frequently used category. The above
mentioned 11 countries include German and France. As it was explained earlier,
bills proposed by the Second Chambers of these two countries receive serious
attention, and so do their recommendations related to bills proposed either by
the First Chamber or by the government. Accordingly, the DPD needs to enhance
further its quality and performance.
68
Refer to Meg Russel, “Responsibilities of Second Chambers: Constitutional and Human Rights
Safeguards”, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol.1, issue 2001, p. 61. Refer also to Samuel C. Patterson and
Anthony Mughan, “Fundamentals of Institutional Design: The Functions and Powers of Parliamentary
Second Chambers”, Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol.1., Issue 1., Spring 2001, p. 52. They both state that this
representation function is just another role of the second chamber, whereas its primary role is to safeguard
institutional stability and constitutional integrity implemented in the amendment to the Constitution.
69
This is also discussed by Roger Scully, “Dealing with Big Brother: Relations with the First
Chamber”, Journal of Legislative Studies, vol.1, issue 1, Spring 2001, p. 98. “A lack of formal powers may
condemn the upper house to a fair degree of political impotence. This does not necessarily mean, however that
the chamber will be completely insignificant. An alternative role to that of powerful legislator may evolve, in
which the upper chamber seeks to its status as part of the parliament to exercise a ‘Voice function. That is, the
chamber, or at least some of its membership, may seek to act as something of a lobbying group for particular
viewpoints, and perhaps attempt to embarrass those in authority by raising particular issues.”
70
Refer to Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony Mughan,(1999),“Senates and the Theory of
Bicameralism”, Senates: Bicameralism in the Contemporary World, eds. Samuel C. Patterson and Anthony
Mughan, (Ohio: The Ohio State University), p. 18-19.
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It is important to strengthen the DPD bearing in mind the objectives of
forming the DPD in the context of the constitutional structure of the Republic of
Indonesia, which are as follows, among other things:71

1) strengthen the bonds among regions within the Unitary State of the
Republic of Indonesia and strengthen national unity in all regions;
2) enhance aggregation and the accommodating of aspirations as well as
the interests of the regions in the formulation of national policy related
to the State and the regions;
3) encourage the acceleration of the process of democratization,
development and progress of the regions in a harmonious and balanced
manner.

As a consequence of the DPD’s weak authorities in the control function,
it is unlikely that the objective of the DPD’s formation will be achieved. In the
context of the DPD’s authorities related to control what needs to be considered
further is not primarily only the DPD’s control of laws related to the interests of
the regions, but the fact that the results of such supervision are reported to the
DPR rather than directly to the government. Under Article 22D paragraph (3) of
the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution it is provided that the DPD may
conduct control on the implementation of laws related to the DPD’s authorities
and report the results of such control conducted by it to the DPR as input for
further consideration and follow up.72
In cases where the Second Chamber has the authority to conduct control,
the Constitution of several countries provides that such authority can be
exercised directly, without having to go through the First Chamber as provided
for in the 1945 Constitution. The Constitution in almost all countries applying the
presidential governance system sets out that both chambers of the parliament
have the authority to summon ministers to request them to provide explanation
(with the exception of the United States of America).
Compared to federal states, a unitary state such as the Republic of
Indonesia obviously devotes greater space to the relationship between the
central government and the regions. For instance, even though it is set forth
under Article 10 paragraph (3) of Law Number 32 Year 2004 that the regional
government deals with all affairs except for foreign politics, defense, security,
judiciary and fiscal matters, as well as religion, when we speak of judicial power,
the aspirations of the regions must be taken into account as they are related to
regional interests such as the shariah judicature, which is a special judicature in
Nangroe Aceh Darussalam. Along the same line, Bhenyamin Hoessein states that
the DPD’s involvement in a bill does not necessarily have to be all encompassing,
rather, it may be related to a single or several articles or to a certain chapter of
the bill concerned.73
71
Sekretariat Jenderal MPR-RI,(2007), Panduan Dalam Memasyarakatkan Undang-Undang Dasar
Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945: Latar Belakang, Proses, dan Hasil Perubahan Undang-Undang
Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 Sesuai dengan Urutan Bab, Pasal, dan Paragraph, (Secretariat
General of the MPR of the Republic of Indonesia, (2007), Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal MPR-RI, p. 93.
72
Refer to Republic of Indonesia, Perubahan Ketiga..., op cit., (Third Amendment), Article 22D
paragraph (3).
73
Bhenyamin Hoessein as quoted in Inosentius Samsul, et al., (2003), Ruang Lingkup dan
Mekanisme Pelaksanaan Fungsi Legislasi Dewan Perwakilan Daerah: Laporan Hasil Penelitian, (Scope and
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Accordingly, in principle there are in fact a great number of bills which also
fall under the scope of the DPD’s authority to the extent that their substantive
content is related to the interests of a region.74 The DPD may make proposals
and participate in the deliberations even though the bill concerned is not related
to the interests of the regions, because the DPD’s authority does not depend
on whether or not the substance of the bill is a regional government affair as
intended in Law Number 32 Year 2004; however, if the substance of the bill
concerned is related to interests of the regions, it is indeed part of the DPD’s
authority.
If not understood clearly, it can cause misconceptions by confusing
the basis of mandate and the agenda for its implementation, and thus it can
create conflict between the people in the regions and the regions concerned.75
Basically, members of the DPD obtain the basis for their mandate when they are
elected by the people in the general elections, after they fulfill the requirement
of minimum support for being nominated as member of the DPD of a certain
province.76 When members of the DPR strive for the interests of the people in
the regions, members of the DPD also automatically strive for the interests of the
regions, because the interests of the people that they are striving for are based
on the perspective and the interest of the region concerned. This means to imply
that the interests of the people in a region and the interests of the region are
in fact not different, let alone contradictory. Ramlan Surbakti gave a statement
along these lines during the deliberations on the third amendment to the 1945
Constitution, describing the interests of regions as follows:
Dan kemudian yang dimaksud kepentingan daerah itu apanya sebetulnya
kalau masalah lingkungan hidup tentu tidak dalam DPD, kepentingan
daerah juga adalah kepentingan rakyat didaerah tersebut sesuai dengan
pembukaan.77
The next question is what is actually meant by regional interest? If it refers
to environmental issue, then it does not fall within the authority of DPD.

Implementation Mechanism of the Legislative Function of the Regional House of Representatives - DPRD:
Research Report), (Jakarta: P3I Setjen DPR-RI, p. 60.
74
In the state of Germany, in practice the second chamber (Bundesrat) has the powers to approve
more than half of the bills proposed as they are related to the interests of the regions. Refer to Werner J.
Patzelt, ”The German Bundesrat”, Senates..., op cit., p. 77.
75
Refer to Satya Arinanto et al., ”Struktur Organisasi dan Kerangka Prosedural bagi Penyempurnaan
Rancangan Kelembagaan DPD RI: Suatu Studi Pendahuluan”, (”Organizational Structure and Procedural
Framework for Improving the Institutional Design of the DPD of the Republic of Indonesia; A Preliminary
Study”), research report Parliamentary Reform Initiatives and DPD Empowerment Secretariat General of
DPD of the Republic of Indonesia in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme, 2006,
p. 112. “Third, the relationship between the DPR and DPD and governmental institutions at the regional
level is apparently marked with reverse logic. On the one hand, the DPD as the representative of regions
tends to have a formal-procedural relationship. This means that, generally, the four members of the DPD as
a unit of representatives of a province do not really have a mandatory basis or solid support from the region
represented by them. Moreover, due to the ambiguity of the agenda of the region granting such mandate and
support, DPD Members receive an overflow of seemingly unlimited hopes and aspirations. Consequently,
we often hear the statement which may sound rather strange, namely that DPD Members wish to “be
accountable” only to their constituents, rather than to the region represented by them.”- translation.
76
Refer to Republic of Indonesia, Undang Undang Tentang Pemilihan Umum, (Law Concerning
General Elections), Law No. 8, State Gazette No. 117, Year 2012, Supplement to the State Gazette No. 4440,
Article 13.
77
Refer to Sekretariat Jenderal MPR-RI, Risalah Rapat Pleno Ke-15 Panitia Ad Hoc I BP MPR...
(Secretariat General of the MPR of the Republic of Indonesia, Minutes of the 15th Plenary Meeting of Ad
Hoc Committee I of the MPR Board of Staff ….),  2001, op cit.,  p. 24.
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Regional interest is also interest of the people in the region as stated in the
Preamble (of the Constitution). – translation

III. Conclusion

In conclusion it can be stated that the DPD’s authorities related to the
control function are provided for in Article 22D paragraph (3), Article 23E
paragraph (2), and Article 23F paragraph (1) of the Third Amendment to the
1945 Constitution. The DPD may conduct control on the implementation of
certain laws related to the interests of the regions, the implementation of the
State Budget (APBN), taxes, education and religion, report the results of such
supervision conducted by it to the DPR, receive reports on the audit of state
finances from BPK, and provide considerations to the DPR in electing members
of the BPK. If analyzed based on the theory of the powers of parliament to
implement the control function, and if analyzed in comparison to various
countries which have second chamber, it becomes evident that the DPD’s above
mentioned powers are extremely limited. There is a need to strengthen the
DPD’s authorities not only to ensure that there is no wasting of budgetary funds,
but also to ensure that the objectives of the DPD can be achieved for a continued
consolidation of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia which consists of
a vast territory and an extremely heterogeneous population.
Under the existing limitations of the DPD’s formal authorities, the
following steps could be taken towards its institutional strengthening:
1. Enhance the capacity of DPD members, by maximizing their liaising role in
promoting the interests of their constituents, and by making continuous
endeavors to maintain the DPD’s integrity and commitment in their capacity
as representatives of the regions with their limited powers.
2. Revitalize the DPD’s Secretariat General and conduct Capacity Building for
the Staff of DPD Secretariat General. It is extremely important to continue
improving the quality and performance of the DPD’s Secretariat General as an
important supporting system for supporting the activities of DPD members.

3. Structure institutional relationships, particularly with its partner in
parliament, namely the DPR, with the government and institutional
relationships with the Regional Governments and the Regional House of
Representatives (DPRD).
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